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]. Morgan Kousser 
Toward "Total Political History": A Rational-
Choice Research Program Political history is at an im-
passe. As the subjects of history expanded in the 1 960s and 1970s, 
and as the prospects of societal change through political means 
dimmed in the 1 98os, the study of war, diplomacy, and the writ-
ings and sayings of statemen-the principal raw materials of the 
old political history- lost favor with students and young profes-
sors alike. The organizing frameworks of politically centered his-
tory- Charles Beard 's class analysis, Frederick Jackson Turner's 
stress on sectional splits, Louis Hartz's Lockeian consensus, Lee 
Benson's ethnoculturalism, and Walter Dean Burnham's critical-
elections theory-have come under telling attack. 1 
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1 For fuller documcnt<ltion of the points made here and ehewhcre in the text, sec the 
Caltech Soc1al Science Working Paper # 581 (Pasadena, 1988) version of this paper. In 
1979, Richard L. McCormick asserted that American political history was "expcnencing 
a crisis." McCormick, "The Parry Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory Hypothesi~. •· 
joumal of Ammcan History, LXVI (1979), 279-298, reprinted in idem, The Party Period awl 
Pttblic PoliC)': American Politics from rhc Ag1• of jackson to the Pro.~ressive Era (New York, 
1986), 197. A I though he has more recently asserted that "The field of American poliLica l 
hislOry is enjoying a remarkable burst of creative and diverse ~cholarship," he discu~ses 
few example~. his judgments of some reccm works may be disputed, and his own 
comments indicate that his claim of a recent "burst" i~ exaggerated. "Political Parties in 
the United States: Reinterpreting Their Natural History," llistory Teacher. XIX (1985), 
15-32. Allan G. Bogue's masterful "Systematic Revisionism and a Generation of f erment 
in American H1~tory," Joumal of Comemporary History, XXI ( 1986), J 3 5-T62, reflecting 
Bogue's understandable nosta lgia for the early days of the "new" post-World War II 
histories, impl ies by comparison much less enthusiasm for current scholarship. The ob-
vious response to a rccem article. Daniel). Gans. "Persistence of Party Success in American 
Presidential Elections," Jottnral of llllerdisciplirwry History, XVI (1985), 221-237-that per-
sistent nauonal party success is not what the cricical-elections theorists meant by stability-
points up the vagueness and underdevelopment of critical-clccuons theory itself. 
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Braudellians scorn all political history as mired in the super-
ficial and transitory, many Marxists dismiss quantitative historians 
as apologists for bourgeois pluralism, and spokespersons for the 
New Right condemn the "new history" for shattering myths that 
they allege are necessary for national unity and legitimacy. Recent 
appeals for a revival of interest in power and state formation 
merely emphasize the impression that political history has become 
a backwater. Social and economic historians often either assert 
that political contests and decisions were irrelevant to their sub-
jects' lives or casuall y project the implications of their studies onto 
the political plane without performing the detailed research into 
political events and institutions that would be necessary to sustain 
their conclusions . Those who cannot count, and refuse to learn, 
damn cliometric works as boring and elitist, and as futile attempts 
to apply the methods and modes of the physical sciences to the 
fund amentally indeterminate thoughts and actions ofhumans, and 
they themselves often proceed as if quantifiable evidence were 
inferior to that from literary sources or were inconsequential for 
all important qucstions. 2 
Yet, at the same time that political history as a whole has 
been deserted, disorganized, denigrated, and divided, many sub-
fields arc flourishing. What arc those subfields and how do they 
fit together? There are nine major divisions, and they may usefully 
be conceived as arranged on the circumference of a circle, a line 
having no beginning or end and implying no hierarchica l rela-
tionships among the areas of study (see Figure t). Histories of 
l For views from France, the left, and the right, sec Jacques Juilliard. "Political His to ry 
in thl· 1980s: RcRections on its Prc~cnt and Future," jouma/ of lmerdisciplirltlry History, XII 
( 19N 1 ), 29-.q; Nancy Fitch, "Statistical l.mtasie~ and Historical Facts: H1st<>ry in Crisis 
and It\ Methodological lmplicatiom." Jlistorif,J! .\lethods, XVII (1984), 239- 54; Gertrude 
Hunmclfarb, The Sew History a11d tht' 0/tl (Carnbndge, Mass .. 1987), 8. 18-19. and reports 
of speeches to publishers by Gary L. 13aucr and Marlowe Tcig, in Waslull.l/1<>11 Po.<t, 16 Jan. 
1986. l·or .!Jeremiad against social scienufic history, sec Lee Benson, "The M1stransfercncc 
Fallacy 111 Explanations of Human Bt•havior," Historical .\fetltods, X VII ( 191!4), 1 18-131, 
and my rl·sponsc, "Must Historians Hcgress? An Answer to Lee Bcnwn," i/Jid., XIX 
(1986), 62-81. There are many more tdl ing cri1icisms of particular works of quantitative 
history by other observers. Indeed, cliomctrinans so readily and often efTcctivcly lambaste 
c,tch others ' work as to leave little to be done by nonspecialists. Such criticisms arc a 
norm al and necessary part of the growth and refinement of knowledge, and arc not 
ncccssanly mdicative of fundamental A,1ws in the works criticized. Many trad itional his-
torians' overreactions to the criticisms d1rcctcd at Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. 
Engerman, Time 011 the Cross (Boston, 197~) mtstakc this point. 
TOTAL POLITICAL HISTORY I 523 
Fig. 1 The Wheel of Politics 
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political thought, ideologies, cultures, values, or attitudes have 
traditionally attracted a great deal of attention and, as the recent 
deluge of articles and books with the words "republican" or 
"political culture" in the title suggests, still do. Next to thought 
and culture, we might place extraparliamentary collective action, 
such as strikes, mobs , and selective or comprehensive violence. 
This domain shades into the more formalized activity of voting 
beba vi or, which, like all collective action, involves an interaction 
between elites and masses. The rules for conducting these contests 
constitute a fourth subdivision. Electorates choose legislatures and 
executives, who in turn provide for the appointment of admin-
istrators and, usually, judges. T hose officials determine and put 
into effect policies w hich have an impact on voters' behavior and 
attitudes, completing the circle. 3 
3 That seemingly all scholars would like to promote thei r own field as more basic or 
important than the rest and that it rakes liule thought to compose arguments for or against 
the primacy of any particular area imply that none is intrinsically more significant. A case 
could be made for including a tenth subfi eld, political discourse, rather than subsuming it 
in the category of political thought. Indeed, Wood and Pocock seem to clJim that it is 
preeminent, on the grounds that the mind-set of an era or subgroup, as reflected in the 
524 I J. MORGAN KOUSSER 
Recent scholarship in these areas has progressed, but on sep-
arate, disconnected tracks. Historians of political thought continue 
to produce subtle readings of texts and bold reinterpretations of 
ideational trends. Studies of electoral behavior show steady im-
provement in methodological sophistication, conceptual clarity, 
and depth and scope of qualitative as well as quantitative research. 
Systematic and often explicitly comparative analyses of the adop-
tion and effects of public policies have begun to cumulate. Un-
doubtedly some of these advances have occurred because scholars 
can explore tightly demarcated areas more thoroughly than un-
limited ones and can follow and respond to a small body of 
literature more easily than to an open-ended one. There are ben-
efits as well as costs to fragmentation. 4 
Nonetheless, these costs are now too great for three reasons. 
First, ignorance of one subfield may undermine conclusions in 
another, or, at the least, it may call into question the generaliza-
associated vocabulary, shapes men's perceptions and constrains the solu tions that they can 
offer to political questions. See, for example, Gordon S. Wood, "Intellectual History and 
the Social Sciences," in John Higham and Paul K. Conkin (eds.), Nwt Directions in American 
lnrellectual History (Baltimore, 1979), 3 5; John G renvi lle Agard Pocock, "The Machiavellian 
t\l(omellt Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology," )ortrnal of Modem History, Llll (1981), 
52. There are three major difficulties with this position: First, if ideologies arc the spectacles 
through w hich people perceive all events, how and why do they change their lenses? 
Second, how would an observer know if they had done so? Without another measurement 
of "reality," one cannot discover the characteristics of the lens, or decide which of two or 
more possible lenses was actually in place. Third, people may disagree on the implications 
of basic values on particular policy issues. If John Adams and Thomas Hutchinson each 
considered that adherence to a common "republican" ideology led them to take the 
(opposite) stands that they did on the American Revolution, why should we consider that 
ideology to have been determinative at all? Yet, if the culturally deterministic interpretation 
of political discourse is relaxed to meet these crit icisms, and one allows for a multiplicity 
of competing basic conceptions at the same time and for conflict over what each conception 
means in practical terms, then what docs the idea add to the simpler view that people just 
have d ifferent preferences? 
4 I have in mind works such as Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins (if the American 
Revolutiofl (Cambridge, Mass. , 1967). Although they disagree about many matters, the 
authors of recent studies of e lectoral behavior, such as Dale 13aum, Th e Civil War Party 
System: The Case of Massachusetts, 1848- 1876 (Chapel Hill, 1983), and William E. Gienapp, 
"Nativism and the Creation of a Republican Majority in the North before the Civi l War," 
)oumal of American History, LXXII (1985), 529- 559, perform statistical analyses of election 
returns as a matter of course. Recem studies of public policy include Carl Harris, "Stability 
and Change in Discrimination Against 131ack Public Schools: Birmingham, Alabama, 
r87l-l9JI," Journal of So11thern History, Ll (1985), 375-416. For other studies of policy 
outputs by historians, see the citations in Kousser, "Restoring Politics to Political History," 
)oumal of lmerdisciplinary History, Xll (1982), 569- 595· 
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bihty of particular findings. Egalitarian political rhetoric, for in-
stance, may mask antiegalitarian policies, and conclusions based 
on the one may be seriously compromised by an examination of 
the other-a point that is as often ignored in practice as it is 
enunciated in principle. Second, concepts developed in one area 
of a discipline, such as political theory or legislative behavior, 
may be inapplicable to others, rendering explanations that connect 
two or more such categories difficult if not impossible. If schemas 
drawn from symbolic anthropology are assumed to explain voter 
behavior, for example, then how do elected officials set policy, 
and what sort of theory could tie the two together? Third, nar-
rowness may feed narrowness. Segmentation within political his-
tory may also encourage its divorce from social and economic 
history, as well as from the adjacent disciplines of economics, 
political science, and sociology. Im pli cations of theories and find-
ings in one division of knowledge may therefore be overlooked. 
How has geographical mobility affected party loyalty, and what 
impact have changes in economic conditions had on electoral 
behavior? Rather than the unifying hub of history that it once 
was, the study of past politics threatens to become a collection of 
tidy, segregated subdivisions isolated from the stimulus and chal-
lenge of continuous intra- and inter-disciplinary contacts, over-
specialized, and, therefore, ignored by the rest of the historical 
and social scientific communities. 5 
The most common response to recognition of the present 
disorder in political history has been to seek unity by imposing 
some substantive synthesis drawn from one subfield on the others. 
Thus, Appleby asserts approvingly that the study of "republican" 
5 Egalitarian rhetoric and inegalitarian policies are contrasted in Kousser, "Progressivism 
for Middle C lass Whites Only: The Distribution of Taxation and Expenditures fo r Edu-
cation in North Carolina, 1880-1910," ) ormwl of So11them History, XLVI (1980), 169-194. 
The possible disconnections between electoral politics and policy formation arc pervasive 
themes of McCormick's essays in Party Period at1d Public Policy. Citing McCormick's 
work, Jean H. Baker concludes that "voting choices" have no "relevance to political 
history" (a position that McCormick himself would not take). Baker, "The Ceremonies 
of Politics," in William J. Cooper, Jr. , et al. , A Master's D11e: Essays i11 Honor of David 
Herbert Donald (Baton Rouge, 1985), 164. The implications of geographical mobility for 
politics are sketched in Kenneth J. Winkle, "A Social Analysis of Voter Turnout in Ohio, 
18S0-!86o," jo11mal of l11terdiscipli11ary History, XIII (1983), 411-435; idem, The Politics of 
Commtmity: Migration a11d Politics i11 A11tebellwn Ohio (Cambridge, 1988). Changes in income 
distribution are estimated in Jeffrey G. Williamson and Peter H. Lindert, American lllequal-
ity: A Macroecoflomic History (New York, 1980). 
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and "liberal" ideologies has shifted the concerns of political his-
torians from "the decision-making individual," political cam-
paigns, and the sociology of voters to "the ineffable aspects of 
past politics." Similarly, Bender's recent appeal to historians to 
concentrate on the development of "public culture" includes a 
disparagement of the history of parties, elections, and adminis-
trations as "superficial," and an insistence that "History is not a 
technical discipline," which implies, among other things, that 
quantitative studies are not history. Both Appleby's and Bender's 
assertions and exhortations should be seen as attempts to subor-
dinate studies of other aspects of politics to what they believe is 
the cultural/ideological core of the subject .6 
Rather than seeking unity by narrowing the focus of political 
history and excluding certain methods and types of historical 
persons from its purview, I propose that political historians adopt 
an approach that offers at least the possibility of a common strat-
egy for understanding all facets of the subject- thus, "total polit-
ical history. " This paradigm, rational-choice theory, has already 
proven useful in economics and political science. In this article, I 
cannot fully discuss the vast and, to historians, largely unknown 
literature. Nor can I produce many examples of its application by 
historians, because so few are curently aware of it. It is possible, 
however, to sketch a few of its central concepts, demonstrate how 
models drawn from its literature can illuminate some problems 
in current disciplinary practice, indicate the wide range of its 
impact in political science, and spell out some of its potential 
implications for political history. Instead of focusing on a single 
issue or policy, such as slavery or the protective tariff, I attempt 
6 Bailyn, "The Challenge of Modern Historiography," America11 Historical Rwiew, 
LXXXVII (1982), 1- 24, is the paradigm of a call for synthesis. Joyce Appleby, "In tro-
duction: Republicanism and Ideology," America11 Quarterly , XXXVII (1985), 462. Thomas 
Bender, "Wholes and Parts: The Need f(lr Synthesis in American History," Journal of 
Ameriwn History, LXXIIl (1986), 120- 136. Although agreeing w ith many of the cautions 
that Eric H. Monkkonen offers in "The Dangers of Synthesis," American Historical Review, 
XCI (1986), r 146-1 157, I would distinguish between substantive syntheses, w hich insist 
on the centrality of certa in themes, and are therefore inherently narrowing, and common 
approaches, which broaden explanations and join subfields. Review articles, which often 
stimulate more research and point to new d irections, may be helpfully synthetic. As Nell 
Irvin Painter and Roy Rosenzweig have noted, it is difficult to see how the history of 
blacks and other minority groups would fit into Bender's scheme except as victims. 
Painter, "Bias and Synthesis in History," Jouma/ of America11 History, CXXIV (1987), 109-
J 12; Rosenzweig, ' 'What ls the Matter with History?" ibid., 117-122. 
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to show how understandings drawn from rational-choice theory 
and its applications to current politics can illuminate many diverse 
problems of nineteenth-century American political history, espe-
cially that of the middle period. 7 
Social, public, collective, or rational-choice theory-no one 
phrase is yet standard-may be defined as the economic study of 
nonmarket decision-making, often employing formal logic, game 
theory, or other mathematical techniques to reach its conclusions. 
The "rationality" in question is of means, not ends. The theory 
is concerned with the ways in which individuals seek to attain 
their goaJs, not with the choice of goals themselves. Thus, a belief 
that slavery was good or bad is considered a normative judgment 
to which the term "rational," in the sense of the theory, simply 
cannot apply. Nor are the goals that people are assumed to be 
pursuing necessarily economic-they may have a preference for 
or against temperance, for example. Like other economists, social-
choice theorists generally assume that the actors (usually individ-
uals, but possibly groups with identical preferences on relevant 
issues) are egoistic, rational, utility maximizers. Empiricists often 
study how well various social-choice and other types of models 
explain actual practices, or laboratory or computer-simulated re-
sults. 8 
7 A narrower concentration would fail to convey the richness and breadth of rational 
choice, and it would give an incorrect impression of theoreti cal closure. Rational choice 
is still vigorously contested ground, and no comprehensive synthesis is likely for some 
years. 
8 William Riker's The Art of Political Maniprtlatio11 (New Haven, 1986} provides a very 
easy and appealing entree, complete with historical examples. More detailed, but still not 
mathematically difficult, arc the pioneering work by Anthony Downs, Atr Eco11omic Theory 
of Democracy (New York, 1975); an excellent short textbook by Norman Frohlich and 
Joe A. Oppenheimer, Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978); and the 
more comprehensive book by Robert Abrams, Fortndations of Political Analysis: An lmro-
drwion to tire Theory of Collective Choice (New York, 1980}. Somewhat more advanced are 
Charles H. Plott, "Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation," 
American journal of Political Science, XX (1976), 511- 596; Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice, 
II (Cambridge, 1989}. Despite protestations tO the contrary, James M. Enelow and Melvin 
J. Hinich, Tire Spatial Tlreory of VotiriJ~: An lntroductiotr (Cambridge, 1984), requires a good 
dea l of math and a wlerance for theorem-proving, but it is the most useful work for 
voting specialists. The most comprehensive text, which is at a medium level of technical 
rigor, is Peter C. O rdeshook's Came Theory and Political Theory (New York, 1986}. On 
the assumptions of rational choice, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual 
Valttes (New York, 1951). As the well-known political stances of such contributors to the 
literature as Arrow, Paul Samuelson, and Amartya K. Sen imply, social choice is not 
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Historians arc so often skeptical of the usefulness of theories 
or abstractions that their potential value needs justification. It is 
not unusual for skeptics to remark, on the one hand, that rational 
choice is "just common sense" (when they agree with some im-
plication), and, on the other hand, that it makes such absurd 
assum ptions that no thinking person could accept it (when they 
disagree with a deduction). Any significant theory about human 
behavior should elicit both reactions. If it never accords with 
standard observations, it will stand no chance of acceptance, 
whereas, if it always does, it will be rejected as mere excess 
baggage. Theories such as those grouped under the rubric "ra-
tional choice" play three useful roles. They provide succinct and 
general descriptions of experience, or help us to make sense of a 
seemingly complex and confusing world. They highlight connec-
tions that we might not otherwise recognize between different 
events or situations. And they make at least some predictions that 
differ from those of other theories, or change the emphasis that 
we might, as a matter of "common sense," place on certain 
clements in a situation. For examples of all three functions, I 
examine rational-choice theory by looking at four of its most 
important principles or models." 
The first is the "free-rider" principle. A hitchiker may ask 
why he should bother to pay for a ride when the truck driver is 
necessari ly politically conservative. Nor is it necessarily strictly individualistic. If all mem-
bers of a group have the same preference ordering (for example, they prefer no regulation 
of liquor to some regulation, and either to absolute prohibiuon), or partially so with 
respect to some issue or policy that they all cons1der important, then they can be treated 
as a single actOr. 
It is true, however, that collenive choice uuplies that the sum of the values can be 
no more than that of the parts- that the co llective preference must be somehow com-
pounded of all of the individual preferences witho ut anything more added. The collectivi ty 
ihclf, in other words, i ~ assumed to have no preferences- there is no separable "public 
mtercst." But since conservatives as 'veil as hberals and radicals may claim a belief in "the 
pubhc interest" or "the community," this assumption does not tie collective choice to any 
particular ideology. f or cmptrical tests of rauonal choice, see, for example. Benjamin I. 
Page, Choice and Echoes i11 Presidential Eleaious: Ra11oua/ .\1au a11d Elmornl Democracy (Chi-
cago, 1978); Larry M . Dartels, " Issue Voting Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Test," 
Ameriwn ]o11mal of Politiral Srimre, XXX (1986), 709-728. 
9 Historians arc all too aware of the Procrustean use of theories by sing le-rninded 
indiv iduals who play fast and loose with fact~. My purpose is to point o ut that theories 
employed with due care can be useful. On the importance of the logic of comparisons in 
htstorical arguments. sec Kousser, "Review Essay: Reconstruction Compared to What?" 
SlaJJcry and Abolit•ou, VII (1986), 290-298. 
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going in that direction anyway. Despite its extreme simplicity, 
this idea has considerable power and a wide range of applications 
to political and social history. Since it takes time and effort to 
organize or take part in formal or informal groups, we should 
expect to find that the members of such groups most often include 
those who are directly affected by a policy or potential policy. 
Because the impact of tariffs on protected industries was large 
and tangible in the nineteenth century, owners and workers in 
those firms were active lobbyists, whereas consumers, for whom 
the effects of a tariff were only diffuse and indirect, were not well 
organized. 10 
Although social or cultural explanations for the decline in 
voter turnout in the north during the early twentieth century may 
stress the post- I 896 disjunction between party and ethnocultural 
lines or changes in the style of politics, the free-rider principle 
points to a shift in the incentives for individual political activists. 
In particular, it suggests that the rise of civil service and the 
corresponding decline in the number of patronage employees 
having a direct interest in encouraging people to vote may account 
for at least part of the lower level of turnout in twentieth-century 
America, compared to that in the nineteenth century. Farmers' 
Alliance organizers received a percentage of the dues of every 
member whom they enrolled. Those who joined the Know-
Nothing or American Protective Association movements appar-
ently valued the camaraderie and ceremony of the lodges, and 
some small-time merchants signed up in hopes that their "broth-
ers" would patronize their businesses. Individual interest in non-
material as well as in material benefits at least partially explains 
the pattern of organization (or lack of organization) in politics, 
and the free-rider principle suggests one reason why policy out-
comes do not always perfectly reflect the attitudes of a populace 
and why the policies adopted should not be taken to be unam-
biguous indications of those attitudes. 11 
10 For an introduction to the free-rider problem, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of 
Collective Actior~ (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 
11 Paul Kleppncr, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Tumous, 1870-1980 (New York, 
1982), 79- 80; Michael E. McGerr, The Declit1e of Popular Politics: The America11 North, 
t865- 1928 (N ew York, 1986}, vii, 8. For suggestive evidence on the connection between 
patronage and turnout, see Kousser, "Suffrage," in Greene (ed. ), Encyclopedia of America11 
Political History: Studies of the Pri11cipal Movemmts atul Ideas (New York, 1984), Ill , 1250-
1251. 
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A second principle is the "paradox of voting." In his pioneer-
ing Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow demonstrated that 
if one posits a few seemingly obvious traits of people's prefer-
ences, then, in distressingly typical cases, no way of making 
decisions, such as majority rule, is guaranteed to lead to consistent 
results. Consider the classic example in Figure 2. Each of three 
voters (denoted r, 2, and 3) has a preference regarding each of 
three alternative policies (denoted A, B, and C) . For instance, voter 
1 prefers A to B and B to C, and, assuming that her choices are 
"transitive," she opts for A over C, as well. What is the three 
voters' collective will? Suppose that they rely on majority rule, 
and that they decide between one pair, with the winner then slated 
against the remaining policy. If they choose first between A and 
B, then A obtains the franchises of voters I and 3, and therefore 
wins, 2-1. But in the "runoff" between C and A, C obtains the 
votes of 2 and 3, so C is the overall winner. If they begin by 
matching B against C, B wins, by the votes of I and 2, but then 
A is victorious over B, so A gets the grand prize. Likewise, if A 
is matched first against C, then C against B, B wins overall. By 
the simplest of changes in the order of voting, therefore, we can 
produce any outcome. Often applied to cases of agenda manip-
ulation by committee chairmen, this model may be used to ex-
plain, for instance, the unraveling of Henry Clay's omnibus bill 
Fig. 2 The Voter's Paradox 
Voters 
2 3 
A B c 
Preferences B c A 
c A B 
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on slavery and the territories in the 3 ISt Congress, and the success 
of Stephen A. Douglas in passing a similar measure by breaking 
it down into sections, each of which enjoyed the support of a 
slightly different majority. The fact that the compromise of 1850 
passed only because of Douglas' canny crafting of the agenda was 
hardly irrelevant to its eventual renunciation by all sides. Manu-
factured consensuses arc not stable solutions. 12 
A third paradigmatic situation is the "Prisoners' Dilemma." 
Two people have been arrested for allegedly committing a crime. 
Each is questioned separately and is presented with the following 
alternatives: 1) If neither of you confesses, you will both get a 
year in jail; 2) If both of you confess, both get five years; 3) If 
you confess and the other docs not, he gets ten years, and you 
go free; 4) If he confesses and you do not, you get ten years, and 
he goes free. The dilemma is that each self-interested prisoner 
would prefer that his partner remained silent, while he himself 
confessed. But since both realize this fact and since the penalty 
for "cooperating" with the other prisoner by not confessing is so 
high (ten years) if the other "defects," the only rational strategy, 
if the game is played once, is for each to confess. If each is logical 
and self-interested, therefore, each ends up with his third choice, 
five years in jail. Studies of this very simple game, which is, in a 
sense, a variation on the free-rider principle, have yielded inter-
esting insights into wars, strikes, arms races, and other forms of 
bargaining. Repeated, regular interaction breeds cooperation, not 
merely from an emotional urge to appear agreeable, but from a 
self-interested fear of reprisals. Conversely, sporadic, irregular 
contact encourages strife; for example, because agent A thinks that 
B will try to throw the last punch, A will strike preemptively and 
n, reasoning similarly, will also try to land the first blow. The 
Fort Sumter crisis may be seen as an example of prisoners' di-
lemma. If James Buchanan had not allowed the vast majority of 
other national government installations to be taken over by the 
Confederates, Abraham Lincoln and the South Carolinians might 
have acted less precipitously simply because both sides would 
have expected to face the same dilemma again and again, and one 
side's action the first time would invite preclusive steps by the 
12 Arrow, Soria/ Choice a11d llldil'id11al Val11es; Holman Hamilton. Prolog11e to Cm!flict: 
The Crisis aud Compromise of 1850 (lexington, Ky., 1964). 109-1 14, 133-1 so. 
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other side the next time. Similarly, transient labor organizers , 
such as those in the International Workers of the World, and 
rapidly growing unions, such as the Knights of Labor in the T88os, 
arc more likely than established unions to engage in strikes, not 
simply because they are more radical or less experienced, but also 
because the reprisal sanction had not yet disciplined them to 
cooperate. 13 
A fina l tool of great heuristic value for the study of politics, 
past or present, is the spatial model of elections. One of the easiest 
ways to visualize opinion and to begin to conceptualize the inter-
action between choices by candidates or parties and voters is 
through a one-dimensional representation such as that in Figure 
3· In this graph, the endpoints of the scale arc the extreme pro-
slavery and antislavery positions, and the points in between reflect 
possible stances on the issue. Individuals are assumed, at any 
particular time, to have an " ideal point" or "bliss point," that is, 
a policy that they would like the nation to adopt. William Lloyd 
Fig. 3 A One-Dimensional Spatial Model of the Slavery Issue 
N R C A F P M 
Pr·o 
Politics Associated with Po in ts: 
N = Nationalization of Slavery 
R = International Slave T rade Allowed 
C = Congressional Slave Code for the Territories 
A = Slavery Allowed in All Territori..-s 
F = Strong Fug iti ve Slave Law 
P = Popular Sovereigmy 
w 
M= Slavery Banned in T erritories North of 36 Deg., 30 Min. 
\Y/= No Slavery in Any Territory 
D = No Slavery in District of Columbia 
T = No Intersta te Slave Trade 
G = No Slavery in United States 
D T G 
Anti 
13 For an excellent, nontechnical introduction to the prisoners' dilemma, see Robert 
Axelrod, The Evolutior1 of Cooperati<lll (New York, 1984). 
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Fig. 4 Two Hypothetical Distributions of Public Opinion on the 
Slavery Issue 
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Garrison, for example, would prefer point G; George Fitzhugh, 
N; Douglas, P; David Wilmot, W; and so on. The opinions of the 
public on the issue may be aggregated to form a curve, such as 
the "normal" or "bell-shaped" curve labeled N in Figure 4, the 
bimodal curve labeled B and outlined in dashes, or any other line 
that sums up people's attitudes. 14 
Given a choice of all the positions in Figure 3, assuming that 
each had a substantial probability of winning and that there were 
no other significant issues, voters would support candidates or 
proposals nearest their ideal positions. That none of these as-
sumptions is plausible emphasizes the difficulty of inferring atti-
tudes from behaviors such as voting, and suggests that more 
complex models are needed. A political structure biased toward 
two-party competition and risk-averse politicians who fear to take 
extreme positions may constrain the choice sets offered to voters. 
14 Spatial models have also been applied tO other substantive areas, such as international 
relations. See, for example, James D. Morrow, "A Spatial Model of International Con-
fl ict," Americall Political Scim.ce Review, LXXX (1986), H3T-T'I50. 
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Many electors may agree with the stances taken by minor parties 
on specific issues, but vote "strategically" for one of the major 
parties because the possibility that the minority parties will be 
victorious is so small. Furthermore, a leader's attitudes may differ 
from those of his followers, who may vote for or otherwise signal 
their allegiance to him because, given the available choices , his 
position is closer to theirs than that of any other leader. And the 
world is seldom composed entirely of single-issue voters. Figure 
5 presents a two-dimensional spatial model, in which a union/ 
secession dimension has been added to the one on slavery. In it, 
Garrison's position (point G) is close to that of the southern fire-
eaters (point F) on the union issue, but very far away on the 
slavery spectrum. Lincoln (point L) and the southern Whigs (point 
Pig. 5 A Two-Dimensional Spatial Model of the Union and Slavery 
Issues 
Disunion 
Union 
B 
w 
F = Southern "Fircatcr" 
G = William Lloyd Garrison 
L = Abraham Lincoln 
W= Southern Whig 
13 = James Buchanan 
L 
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W) also agree on the value of the union and disagree, although 
not so much as Garrison and the fire-eaters do, on slavery. Buch-
anan (point B) is represented as an extreme doughface, poised 
between the union at all costs and sacrificing it to protect slavery 
and avoid civil war. Is 
Adding a second dimension emphasizes another feature of 
the analysis of public opinion. People's positions on a particular 
proposal, say, the Wilmot Proviso, may have been a function of 
their stances on two or more larger issues, which may not have 
correlated perfectly. It is reasonable to say that one might prefer 
to see slavery abolished entirely, but that, since such a proposal 
would induce the south to secede, one would settle for ending 
slavery in the territories. Therefore, later analysts cannot unam-
biguously determine attitudes on slavery or any other issue from 
expressions of opinion or votes relating only to that topic unless 
all relevant policies were directly correlated. To be perfectly cor-
related in the two-dimensional case, the positions of nearly every-
one would have to fa ll on a line at a 45 degree angle to each axis. 16 
In fact, there are generally more than two issues, people's 
opinions differ not only on what to do, but on how important 
each issue is, and people change their minds. Although it is dif-
ficult to represent three or more issues geometrically, there is no 
difficulty in doing so algebraically. Suppose we scale each issue 
from I to IO and suppose that four issues dominated political 
discussion at the time. For concreteness, let us take these issues 
from Benson's "ethnocultural thesis" and call them temperance, 
slavery, internal improvements, and religious-school subsidies. 
"Puritans" would be likely to take the prohibitionist, antislavery; 
prodeveJopment, and anti-parochial-school positions on this set 
15 Naturally, in order for this model to explain anything, at least some voters must be 
attentive. Some scholars deny that nineteenth-century voters were. In her Affairs of Party: 
Tl1e Political Culture of North em Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth CentHry (Ithaca, 1983), 325, 
for instance, Baker states, without any evidence at all, that rhe Irish, transplanted south-
erners in the Midwest, and other antebellum northerners, "though unfamiliar with specific 
campaign issues," joined the Democrat.s in order to experience "a sense of Americanness." 
If it were somehow verified, this patronizing statement would give pause to proponents 
of rational choice. 
16 Historians have often recognized this point. See, for example, David M. Potter, "Why 
the Republicans Rejected !3oth Compromise and Secession," in idem, The South and the 
Sectional Colljlict (Baton Rouge, 1968), 243-262. 
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of issues, which we may denominate, for convenience, scale po-
sition r on each issue. This point could be represented by the 
ordered vector {I, I, I, I}Y 
But even if preferences were correlated across issues, people 
might differ on the weights that they placed on each and on the 
certainty with which they held their positions . To represent these 
facets of opinions in our algebraic formulation, we can simply 
add more lines to the issues vector to form a series of related 
vectors that might be called an "opinion matrix. "18 
In Figure 6, each issue is associated with a weight, scaled 
from I to IO, and an index of certainty is similarly scaled. The 
individual portrayed considers the last two issues very important, 
Fig. 6 An Individual's Opinion Matrix 
Issue Positions 
Weights 
Certainty 
T = Temperance 
S = Slavery 
T 
3 
5 
Is slitS 
s 
6 2 
4 
l = Internal Improvements 
R = Rel ig ious-school subsidies 
.R 
2 
3 
NOTE The numbers arc scale positions from 
1 to TO, with t representing the most favorable 
view of temperance and internal improvements, 
and the least favorable view of slavery and 
subsidies to religious schools. 
' 7 The endpoints and inrervals arc arbitrary, or, to speak more technically, va lid only 
up to a linear transformation, but the scale preserves the order on each issue, which is the 
prime concern. The "ethnocultural thes is" was invented by Benson, The Concept of Jack -
sonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton, 1961). 
18 Historians often claim to be able to tell how m uch weight the voters placed on more 
than one issue. See, for example, Joel H. Silbey, The Partisan Imperative: Tire Dynamics of 
Americatl Politics Before the Civil War (New York, 1985), 150; Gienapp, The Origins oftlu 
Republicat1 Party, 1852-1856 (New York, 1987), 371, 42 1 
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the first, nearly as important, but the second , relatively unim-
portant. If she were considering w hich of two candidates to vote 
for, she would place much less emphasis on thetr stances on 
slavery than on internal tmprovements and reltgtous school sub-
sidies. Furthermore, although her view on intern ,tlunprovements 
is very firm, she is not so sure of herself on religious schools, and 
is even less committed on tem perance and slavery. Thus, she 
might easily be convinced ro change her mind between elections 
or during an election campaign on the first two issues. 
Even though it is true that historians will rarely have enough 
data co estim ate the entries in such an opinion matrix, this and 
the other three models dra \\ n from rational choiCe can add con-
siderably to our understanding of the connecttons between 
thought, values, behefs, or attitudes, and the behavior of voters, 
legislators, execuoves, or any other political actors. Treating po-
litical culture as a '>eparate subficld of political lmrory may lead 
to misinterpretations of political culture itself. Tying it to the 
study of other forms of political behavior by viewing politi cal 
actors as p urposive agents w ho seck to attain policy and personal 
goals, as rational choice docs, may help us to avoid misconceiving 
political ideas. How might rational choice change our interpre-
tation of the expressed belief<> of historical figure!)? 
First, the opinion matrix heuristic suggests that people may 
change their behavtor not because they have ahen:d their opinions. 
but because the emphasis that they put on an issltc has changed . 
Wendell Phillips, for example, opposed slavery before 1837, and 
spoke out prominently against it only after Elijah Lovejoy's lynch-
ing. O nce the South seceded, and the fear of emL:mgcring the 
Union by favoring abolition was no longer relevant, many north-
erners felt freer to give vent to their antislavery feelings. There-
fore, ro determine the issue position-that is, the entry in the first 
row of Figure 6-\\ c must look at evidence after, as well as before 
I86T. 
Second, people ma y ho ld opinions, but not strongly. Thus, 
opposition to black suffrage outside the South was vehement in 
rhe years from 1 8()5 to r 868, but, immediately after the passage 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, Democrats began to woo black 
voters. This evidence implies that, for all their bluster, many 
Democrats were not deeply committed to their prev ious racist 
opinions. That is, the entry 111 row t\VO of Figure 6 relating to 
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black suffrage was smaJI for many northern Democrats . Again, 
descriptions of their behavior should affect assessments of their 
thoughts and culture, and the heurisic value ofFigure 6 is to point 
out that evidence from both subfields is necessary to make judg-
ments in either. Historians who gauge opinion by quoting state-
ments on issues often assume implicitly that every politician or 
voter puts the same weight on any particular issue, or that every-
one is equally certain of her opinion, or that historians know the 
weight and certitude values of every person's opinion matrix. 
T hird, the explicit representation of attitudes throws light on 
claims that the public or subsets ofit shared a common ideology 
or political culture. Analysts who make those assertions must 
implicitly believe that all people in the relevant group , followers 
as well as leaders, have identical or at least very similar opinion 
matrices , and that groups with different political cultures have 
different ones . This realization highlights evidentiary require-
ments that cultural and intellectual historians do not often address: 
elites' values or positions may differ from those of the masses, 
and the two types of data should not be confused; the same 
abstract values may welJ translate into different positions on con-
crete issues, or devotees of different ideologies may agree on 
practical policies; and the extent of overlap or difference between 
people's opinions must be determined empirically and taken into 
account in any causal explanation of people's behavior. The po-
litical culture of Whig leaders, for instance, may not have been 
that of the Whig voters; if artisans and their employers shared a 
"republican" ideology, it is difficult to attribute any causal im-
portance to that ideology; and it is dubious to postulate a ho-
mogeneous Democratic political culture just at the time in the 
J 8sos when large numbers of northern Democrats were deserting 
the party. 19 
19 A selection of "political culture" studies would include Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free 
Labor, free Men: Th e Ideology of the Republican Party before the Ci11il War (New York, 1970); 
Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept 
of Pol itical Culture," in Louis Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean (eds.), The Idea ofCulture 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1973), 65-76; Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Cultr<re 
of the America11 Whigs (Chicago, 1979); Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City 
and the Rise of tire America11 Workirtg Class, 1788-t850 (New York, 1984); Baker, Affairs of 
Party. In The Panic of 1857 a11d the Comir1g oft he Civil War (Baton Rouge, 1987), xiv, James 
L. Huston confesses: "There is danger in imputing the attitudes and sent iments of some 
for others, but I shall risk making the assumption." 
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Fourth, expressions of opinion may not be "sincere-that is, 
people may not reveal their "true" positions because they wish to 
move opinion closer to them in a sequence of votes, or because 
they are not offered a full range of choices, or because they have 
multiple objectives. If strategic behavior is pervasive, as the ra-
tional-choice approach stresses, then their statements cannot be 
unquestioningly assumed to reflect their views. For instance, con-
gressmen may defeat moderate proposals in order to force mod-
erates to join them in later votes against extremists from the other 
side; voters in winner-take-all elections may cast their ballots for 
their second or third choices to prevent the election of their least 
favored alternative; politicians seeking election may stay within 
the bounds of public opinion. Thus, the opposition of both an-
tislavery and the proslavery forces doomed the Crittenden Com-
promise. Jacksonians loaded the "Tariff of Abominations" with 
higher duties in an attempt (which backfired) to defeat it. The 
fact that men in some northern states made the Know-Nothings, 
rather than the Republicans, temporarily the chief opposition 
party to the Democrats is no sure sign that they weighed nativism 
higher than antislavery in their preferences. Reconstruction Re-
publicans no doubt down played the radicalism of the Fourteenth 
Amendment during the 1866 campaign in order 'to blun t Demo-
cratic attacks.2o 
Fifth, since behavior is often an indication of attitudes, any 
descriptive analysis of attitudes must attempt to distinguish slo-
gans and rationalizations from "true" avowals of belief. T he state-
ment of a northerner who claimed to be against slavery, but voted 
for John C. Breckinridge in 186o, is suspect. Nineteenth-century 
paeans to republican virtue, liberty, and equality should be treated 
with the same healthy skepticism that we apply to similar oro-
20 The manipulability of agendas implies strategic behavior. T hus, insincere voting is a 
corollary of the paradox of voting, as well as of the difficu lty of attain ing stable equilibria 
in multidimensional spatial models. For stra tegic congressional behavior, see David Her-
bert Donald, The Politics of Reco11structio11, t86J-t867 (!:laton Rouge, 1965); Lawanda Cox, 
Lincoln mrd Black Freedom: A Study i11 Presideutinl Leaders/r ip (Columbia, S.C., rg8 r), 142-
184. O n the tariff of 1828, see Dall W. Forsythe, Taxation mrd Political Chartge in the Yo111rg 
Nntio11 , t78 t- t833· (New York, 1977), 76- 87. Gienapp, "Nativism and the Creation of a 
Hcpublican Majority, " 539-540, 547, neglects stra tegic considera tions in a voter's decision 
to cast a ballot for the American ticket in 1855. For the Fourteenth Amendment issue, see 
Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Co11gressio11al Republicans and Reco11struc-
tio11, t863-1869 (New York, 1974), 196- 202. 
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tundities today. For instance, the admission by advocates of the 
"republicanism thesis" that there was a growing disjunction be-
tween "rhetoric and reality" e,ven during the Revolution, and that 
it widened later, should raise suspicions about the imputation of 
"republican" values to the populace. It is always difficult, even 
with survey questions that arc specifically designed for the pur-
pose, to distinguish rationalization from "real" motives, but, by 
repeatedly com paring behavior to belief, and one belief or set of 
beliefs to another, historians can often expose disjunctions or 
misrepresentations. 21 
Sixth, many current treatments of political ideas assume that 
attitudes always produce behavior, rather than, sometimes, vice-
versa, and they do not specify whether a basic orientation, such 
as ethnoreligious identification, causes people to take specific 
stances on issues or whether that orientation merely summarizes 
positions on a series of related issues. Here, empirical findings 
from social psychology can supplement notions from rational 
choice. Pettigrew suggests that, in some instances, changed be-
havior can precede and influence attitudes. Forced by the national 
government to accept substantial amounts of racial integration in 
schools and public accommodations during the 1960s and 1970s, 
white southerners subsequently gave substantially more liberal 
responses on the desirability of interracial contacts . The failure of 
secession and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment seem to 
have reduced southern white proslavery opinion. Schuman, 
Steeh, and Bobo found that white attitudes on particular racial 
21 For "republicanism," see Robert E. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The 
Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in America," William a11d Mary Quar-
terly, XXIX {1972), 72-73; idem, "Hcpublicanisrn and Early American Historiography," 
ibid., XXXIX (1982), 340-352;]ames T. Kloppenburg, "The Virtues of Liberalism: Chris-
tianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse," Jot~mal of 
American History, LXXIV (1987), 24. On rationalization, see Gregory B. Markus and 
Philip E. Converse, "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice," in 
Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (eds.), Co11troversies in Voti11g Behavior (Wash-
ington, 1984; 2nd ed.), IJ6-IJ8. To give one example of comparing behavior to bel ief, 
the partisan and class motives of the southern disfranchisers of the turn of this century 
were rarely expressed publicly, but an analysis of the content and timing of the measures 
that they espoused makes it clear that the racial and "good government" rhetoric that they 
promulgated should not be accep ted entirely at face va lue. See Kousser, The Shaping of 
Soutllem Politics: Suffrage Restricrion and the Establishmmt of the One-Party South, t880-1910 
(New Haven, 1974). For a more detailed analysis of difficult problems in determining 
human motives, see idem , "Expert Witnesses, Rational Choice, and the Search for Intent," 
Cot1Stilutional Commmtary, V (1988), 349- 373. 
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issues in America from the r940s to the 1980s were by no means 
all of one piece. Trends in survey answers to questions about 
racial intermarriage or housing were not precisely parallel to those 
about busing or the integration of public places. To array all of 
these views under the single rubric of "racism" or to contend that 
people's positions on a general racist dimension caused them to 
take specific stands or to behave in a particular manner is mis-
leading. The contributions of rational choice and of the opinion 
matrix here are to make clear that positions on seemingly related 
issues may or may not be correlated in ways that observers may 
imagine-that the existence of connections ought not to be de-
cided unconsciously by subsuming issues under such rubrics as 
racism or ethnoreligious conflicts-and to underline that the causal 
links between thought and behavior can run in both directions. 22 
As useful as rational-choice models are in illuminating some 
of the implicit claims of and problems with the study of political 
ideas, they are no substitute for that subfield, and rational choice 
and intellectual/cultural history may best be seen as complemen-
tary, not contradictory to each other. Like economists in general, 
rational-choice theorists generally do not attempt to explain how 
and why people arrive at their preferences. "Rationality," as they 
use the term, begins only after at least some values are chosen, 
however thoughtful or intuitive the process for arriving at them. 
Taking attitudes as given, students of social choice try to reason 
abstractly and generally about how people who want to attain 
specific goals would act, and then, sometimes, test these theoret-
ical predictions against descriptions of actual behavior. The trou-
ble is not only that they ignore the interesting and important 
process of value formation and the connections between broad 
ideas and specific policy stances, but that they often posit specific 
preferences for individuals or groups on the basis of distressingly 
little evidence. 23 
22 Thomas F. Pett igrew, "Prejudice," in Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov, and Oscar 
Handlin (eds.), Harvard Encyclopedia of American Etl111ic Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 
829, and other papers cited there; Howard Schuman, Charlotte Stech, and Lawrence 
Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America: Tre11ds a11d lnterpretatio11s (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 71-
138. For historians' treatment of "racism" or "prejudice" or "ami-Negro attitudes," see, 
for instance, Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-186o 
(Chicago, 196r), vi i; Eugene H. Berwanger, The Fro11tier Against Slavery: Westem Anti-
Negro Prej11dice and the Slavery Extensio11 Co11troversy (Urbana, 1967), I; V. Jacque Voegeli, 
Free Bur Not Equal: The Midrvest and the Negro D11ring rhe Civil War (Chicago, 1967), 1. 
23 For a thoughtful criticism of neoclassical economics' inattention to preference changes, 
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Another major concentration in political history, electoral behav-
ior, is particularly twinned with its political-science counterpart, 
for electoral behavior, in American political science at least, has 
traditionally been an intensely studied subject. Yet, whereas the 
so-called "new political historians" of the 1960s and early 1970s 
were fully aware of and drew freely upon developments in their 
sister subdiscipline, most younger political historians today pay 
less attention to developments in political science, possibly be-
cause of advances in the typical level of mathematical techniques 
used in its books and articles. Still deeply influenced by the early 
Michigan School's overly deterministic social-psychological ap-
proach, its stress on party identification, and its contention that 
the masses of voters have no settled or organized political opin-
ions, the vast majority of political historians have ignored the 
controversy over issue voting, the debate over the effect of eco-
nomic conditions on elections, advances in such statistical meth-
ods as logit, probit, simultaneous equations , and LISREL (Linear 
Structural RElationships), and, most significantly, the develop-
ment of the rational-choice perspective. 24 
Paradoxically, at the same time that historians have been 
reading less political science, political scientists have become more 
historical in outlook. M esmerized by the powerful tools of survey 
analysis, possessing only a few scholarly nationwide polls, and 
see Albert 0. Hirschman, "Against Pars imony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some 
Categories of Economic D iscourse," Eco11omics tmd Philosophy, I (1985), 7-2 1. The topic 
of the relation between funda mental values and policy choices is underdeveloped in social 
choice, and it clearly needs further work. 
"Preferences" may be thought of as basic airns, such as peace or health or prosperity, 
or as proximate goals, such as ending slavery or d iscouraging the consumption of alcohol 
or preventing government subsidies for Catholic schools. If broad, generally consensual 
va lues are emphasized, then theory can yield no predictions about behavior, because every 
politician w ill claim to endorse those ends. But if only immediate issues arc treated, then 
analysts will miss politicians' efforts to convince the e lectora te or other politicians that 
cenain means, but not othe rs, will bring about desired ends, or rhat certain issues are 
mo·re important rhan others, or that certain objectives are infeasible. As empirical appli-
cations of socia l choice, including historical app lica tions, increase, theorists may realize 
more clearly how imponant it is to confront the " level of va lues" problem. The emphasis 
of ra tional choice on cand idates' strategies, however, suggests that the approach will be 
more concerned with the proble m than traditional social psychology has been. 
24 For the continued dominance of the early Michigan School model, sec for example, 
Rona ld P. Formisano, The Birth of lvlass Political Parries: Michiga11, 1827-1861 (Princeton, 
1971), TT - 14; Will iam G. Shade, lJa11ks or No Banks: The Mo11ey Issue ill Westem Politics, 
1832-1865 (Detroit, 1973), 17; Si lbcy, A Respectable Mi11ority: The Democratic Party i11 the 
Civil War Era, t86o- 1868 (New York, 1977), 5-7. 
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mistrusting aggregate data because of the much feared and often 
misunderstood "ecological fallacy," most American political sci-
entists of the 1950s and early 1960s ignored history and stated 
their findings as timeless generalizations. But the accumulation of 
three decades of opinion polls in America and other countries, 
the realization of the disadvantages of sample surveys, and the 
development of statistical methods for overcoming some prob-
lems of aggregation have led political scientists to pay much more 
attention to change, to emphasize different and variable factors in 
their explanations , and to investigate the pre-World II era. 25 
History and the Michigan branch of social psychology are so 
ill-matched that it is a wonder that the affair has lasted so long. 
The original Michigan School considered political issues as eva-
nescent, and of little importance in elections, because voters, as 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes found, were usually too 
wedded to parties, too unconcerned with politics, and too non-
ideological and mentally disorganized to respond to ideas. Polit-
ical historians, by contrast, traditionally have focused almost ex-
clusively on issues, have believed that politics mattered to their 
subjects, and have treated the beliefs of the public as more coher-
ent and standardized than even the most generous studies of 
modern public opinion find them to be. The American Voter took 
candidates' strategies and electoral rules as exogenously given, 
and elites and local contexts as practically invisible. Historians, 
even some of those whose citations to the political science liter-
ature are largely to the Michigan School, have lavished attention 
on just these facets of politics. In the Michigan model, normality 
is the mode, and anything beyond temporary deviations is diffi-
cult to explain. Historians gravitate toward change. The sociali-
zation literature tells us a lot about how children in general learn 
about politics, but little about why specific groups of people 
absorb different lessons, o r how adults continue their education-
topics with which historians are usually much more concerned. 
Michigan has little to say about legislatures, committees, bureau-
cracies, and policies; historians are or should be crucially absorbed 
in the study of these topics. Most important, Michigan is deter-
25 See, for example, Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John P. Petrocik, The Changi11g 
America11 Vorer (Cambridge, Mass., 1976); Gerald H. Kramer, "The Ecological Fallacy 
Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and 
Sociotropic Voting," America11 Political Scimce Revierv, LXXVII (1983), 92- 111. 
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ministic-party identification is a supplement to every baby's 
formula-but historians of nearly every ideological stripe treat 
individuals or classes of people as having the ability to choose. 26 
In each respect, rational-choice theory is a more attractive 
partner for political history. In the field of electoral behavior, 
social choice treats issues and policies as central, for voters are 
assumed to minimize the distance between their preferences 
(which may include opinions about the candidates' personal traits) 
and the stances of those who seek their support. In Figure 3, for 
instance, voters support the candidate whose position is closest 
to their own. Candidates , in turn, position themse.lves to win 
nominations, and parties, to win elections by moving, or seeming 
to move, toward popular orientations. Politicians running for 
office, committee chairmen, and bureaucrats shape voting rules 
and agendas so as to attain their goals, or at least to get as close 
to them as they can. Electors adopt shortcuts to reduce the cost 
of gathering information and making decisions. Shifts in the in-
clinations of the voters or in the tactics of candidates modify 
outcomes and policies. Since all players in the game, particularly 
the officeholders and officeseekers, continually reassess the posi-
26 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E . Stokes, Tile 
America11 Voter (New York, 1960), and their Electiot1S and the Political Order (New York, 
1966) are the classic sources for the "Michigan" o r "social psychological" model. For a 
defensive resta tement that understates the theory-laden character of h is model and the 
d ifferences between it and the rational-choice approach, see Converse, "Public Opinion 
and Voting Behavior," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of 
Political Science (Reading, Mass., 1975), IV, 75-169. More recen t emendations have moved 
closer to synthesizing the two viewpoints. See, for example, Markus and Converse, 
"Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model," 132-r 53; Morris P. Fiorina, "Explorations of 
a Theory of Party Identification," in N iemi and Weisberg (eds.), Co11troversies in Voting 
Behar1ior, 406-423 . 
lt has often been noted, for example in Frolich and Oppenheimer, Modem Political 
Economy, 134, that the Michigan School finding that voters' bel ie f systems are not well 
organized reflects the political scientists' expectations that votes would fall nea tly on a 
single right-left issue continuum . If, instead, the Michigan School had anticipated that the 
voters would emphasize several diffe rent issues, they would presumably have pictured the 
mass publ ic as m uch more "rational. " For example, Gienapp, Origins of the Republicall 
Party, 6, 423, cites Michigan, but marvelously describes campaign strategies. For normality 
as the mode, sec Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior, " 138- r44· Good 
introductions to the socializa tion literature include David 0 . Scars, "Political Socializa-
tion," in Greenstein and Pols by (eds. ), Hm1dbook of Political Science, IJ, IJ s-IJ9; Charles H. 
Frank lin, "Issue Preference, Socializa tion, and the Evolution of Party Identification," 
America11 Journal of Political Scimce, XXVIII (1984), 459-478. 
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tions, past moves, and possible designs of the other participants , 
there is little stasis or determinism. 27 
When they renounced narrative for a more structural ap-
proach, political historians of the 1960s and 1970s also embraced 
social psychology without entirely realizing the consequences of 
that act. The two ch ief organizing concepts of the new political 
history-critical elections and the ethnocultural thesis-have al-
ways been closely attached to social psychological models. From 
the time of its original formulation, the ethnocultural thesis has 
been tied to Merton's concept of "negative reference groups." In 
th is view, people form positive identifications with certain social 
groups, such as religious or ethn ic ones, define others as adver-
saries, and enter politics to win symbolic victories over their 
adversaries . Issues become merely convenient weapons in largely 
sham battles over relative prestige and nonmaterial social status. 
Neither Merton nor Benson, who introduced Merton's notion 
into history, made clear how positive or negative reference groups 
formed or maintained themselves, how they overcame the free-
rider problem, or why they were satisfied with merely play-acted 
victories or defeats. Like the Michigan School, morever, the eth-
nocultural thesis is difficult to reconcile with anything more than 
minor fluctuations, for the only major sources of change are shifts 
in the balance of ethnocultural groups in the population. A recent, 
more sensitive attempt to determine the weight of antislavery, 
anti-foreignism, anti-Catholicism, and temperance in the shift 
from the "second" to the "third party system" abandons a deter-
ministic social-psychological stance for a view much more con-
sonant with rational choice. 28 
The critical-elections thesis has more diverse origins and is 
less clearly based on any particular psychological understanding. 
Nevertheless, its social determinism is most compatible with a 
27 Those personal trai ts of candidates chat affect their abil ity or w ill ingness to carry out 
campaign pro mises are important to rational voters, whereas those that do not, such as 
glamour, taste in clo thes, or avuncularity, arc: irrelevant. 
28 On negative reference groups, sec Benson, Co11Cept oj]ackso11ian Democracy, 285; idem, 
"Mistransference Fallacy," 124; Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struct11re (New 
York, 1957), 225-3 87. Gienapp treated the four issues as separable and often separated. 
Gienapp, Origi11s of the Rep11blica11 Party, T64, 279, 289. Whether this represents an aban-
donment o r merely a rad ical modifica tion of the c thnocultural thesis, it is much less 
consonant with M ichigan and Merton than Benson's view was. 
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Michigan School view of politics. In Burnham's r970 formulation 
of critical-elections theory, societal crises, such as the conflict over 
slavery or the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s, transformed 
the political loyalties of a generation of voters. Once a crisis was 
past, the line of political cleavage was largely fixed until the next 
great upheaval. This American substitute for revolution also 
transmogrified and then stabilized the policy agenda. The focus 
is on the big changes, what Michigan termed the "long-term 
forces," not the minor oscillations or "short-term forces" within 
stable periods. 29 
In an electoral history influenced by the rational-choice per-
spective, the notion of critical elections and party systems and the 
ethnocultural thesis will not be abandoned, but their influence 
will be reduced, and each will be seen in a different light. Like-
wise, the notion of party identification will be redefined. Rather 
than assuming that people chose a party and then adhered to it 
unsbakably, rational-choice-oriented analysts will consider party 
identification a continuous shorthand assessment of party and 
candidate performance and attractiveness, a summary measure of 
each voter's past and current expectations of how closely each 
competing set of politicians is likely to come to fulfi lling the 
voter's goals. If this view is correct, then patterns of electoral 
behavior should be expected to vary somewhat from election to 
election, depending on the degree of similarity of candidates, 
issues, and economic conditions. Continuity of policies, compe-
tence, and a lack of economic or military upheaval give voters 
little reason to change and their opposites, much. Therefore, a 
rational-choice approach can encompass both change and stability 
in electoral patterns. 3° 
29 Valdimcr Orlando Kcr. Jr.. the ongmator of cnucal elecuons theory, bec.mtc one of 
Michtgan's chief critics later in hfc (Ill his book The Respo11si/Jir Electorate !Nt·w York, 
19661), and his work was one of the main sources of inspiration for the leading work in 
voting behavior that is infused with a rationa l-choice approach (Fiorina's l?nrospective 
Voti11,~ i11 America11 N<lli(llwl Election; (New Haven, 1981)). The most comprehensive state-
ment of the critical clecuons thesiS IS Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elt-aitms a11d the 
.\faiJISpriii.~S <'./ America11 Polirics (New York, 1970), 1-1 o, 175-193. For a measured defense, 
see his "Pcriodization Schemes and 'Party Systems': The 'System of 1896' a~ a Case in 
Point," St•dnl Science 1/istory, X (19M), 263-314. 
30 Slighc variarions of the critical-elections thesb appear in William Nisbet Chambers 
and Burnham (eds.), Tile Ameru<111 Parry Systems· Sra.~es of Politiml De•'rlc>pmmt (New 
York, 1967); Burnham, The C11rrmt Crisis i11 .tlmcrira11 Politics (New York. 1982). The 
nineteenth-century clccrorare was less scablc than ic appears in some works. For mstancc, 
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Because the functions of various governments differed and 
changed over time, and because the candidates and their positions 
on policy issues did as well, election results should often have 
diverged at the national and subnational levels. If a critical election 
is seen as merely an occasion when an unusually large number of 
voters made atypically great changes in their expectations about 
which party at the national, state, or local level was closer to their 
ideal points and was more likely to run the government compe-
tently, then variations in the patterr:s of voting at each govern-
mental level should be seen not as anomalous, but as merely 
rational. Moreover, the contention that local politics was some-
how more fundamental than national politics would no longer 
make any sense if the two alignments were not assumed to be 
perfectly correlated. Note the contrast between this stance and 
symbolic-anthropological, social- psychological, or sociological 
interpretations. If attachments to parties are considered subra-
tional or voting is viewed merely as an uncalculating ritual act, 
the outcomes should be uniform across elections for different 
offices. Such theories and rational choice make very different 
empirical predictions. JJ 
Thomas B. Alexander, "The Dimensions of Partisan Constancy in Presidcnual Elections 
from 1840 to 186o," in Stephen E. Maizlish and John ]. Kushma (eds.), Essnys 011 Americn11 
Allre/Jellum Politics, 184o-186o (College Station. Tex., 1982), 70-121, overstates his case 
by artificially fusing Whigs, Free S01ler;,, Know-Nothings , and all varictic;, of Democrats 
into two groups and by disregarding rurnout shifrs. William J. Cooper, Jr., The South a11d 
the Politrcs of Slat•ery, 1818- 1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), and Liberty mrd Slm•t"ry: Southern 
Polirio ro 186o (New York, 1983), estabhshes his similar thesis more subtly by not 
considering voting rcwrns systematically at all. As John 1·. Reynolds and McCormick 
have shown, split-t icket voting was much more common at the subcounty level during 
the 188os than votes Jggregated at the coumy or state levels imply. In New York and 
New Jersey, the)' conclude, "late nmctcenth-century vonng bcha,·ior was les; stable and 
umform than is commonly supposed." Sec their "Outlawmg 'Treachery': Spht Tickets 
and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 188o-1910," joumal of Ameriw11 History, 
LXXII (1986), 843. 
31 On the primacy of local pol itics, ;cc Silbey, Bogue, and Will iam II. Flanigan, "In-
troduction ro Part Three," in idem (cds.), The Hislory of Americn11 Electoral Behm,ior (Prince-
ron, 1978), 253-258, and works cited there; Samuel P. Hays, America11 Polrticcll History as 
Socitrl A11alysis (Knox,•i llc, 1980), 53-56, 1!6; Kousser, "Hi\tory as Past Sociology in the 
Work of Samuel P. Hays," Historical Alftl10ds, XIV (r981). 181-1 86: Harry L. Watson, 
Jnckscmicw Politics aud Cm111111111ity Coufiia: Th e F.mergmce ofrhc• Second Americnu Party Sysrem 
ill C11mbcrlaud CoHill)', Norlh Carot;,w (llaton Rouge, 1981), 10. Gicnapp's view tha t the 
first ~tage of the breakup of rhe "second party system" occurred when voters in northern 
state and local clecriOJl~ m 1853-1854 turned to rhe Know-Nothing parry doc~ not ncc-
essanly 1rnply that those voters weighed nativism more heavily than anmlavcry. States 
and localities could take ami-Catholic acuons, wherea> northern stare governments could 
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Ethnoreligious issues undoubtedly did dominate many local 
and state elections, and some at the national level, but their im-
portance should not be assumed constant or universal any more 
than the significance of class or race or region or corruption or 
general economic performance or foreign policy or any other 
issues should be. Rather than trying to decide which of two 
alignments, usually class or ethnocultu ra l, pervaded all of the 
elections in a whole "era ," political historians should be attempt-
ing to determine the mix of all issues that voters ' and candidates' 
decisions propelled to the fore in each election and how those 
changed from election to election. Critical elections will continue 
to attract attention, but, if candidates and voters constantly mon-
itored each other, then incremental, homeostatic adjustments 
should receive more emphasis than they do in much current 
historiography. 32 
Two recent historical studies, which reason explicitly from 
Fiorina's insights in Retrospective Vo ti11g in American National I3lec-
tions, show that the rational-choice approach can usefully be ap-
plied to historical data. In a brilliant paper on elections from 1836 
to 1844 that rests on an ingenious correlation of price series and 
voting, Holt demonstrated that, in this formative period of the 
Jacksonian party system, "economic issues and contrasting party 
records were the central determinants of voting behavior .... " 
Not only docs I Iolt replace the static cultural determinism of the 
ethnocultural school w ith a dynamic view of voters responding 
to the apparent successes and failures of the Democratic and Whig 
economic policies, but he also shows that turnout spurted before 
the presidentia l campaign of 1840. l t was not merely issueless, 
ceremonial hoopla about "Log Cabins and Hard C ider" that stim-
ulated the electorate, but hard money and hard times. Unlike 
do little to abola~h slavery in the south. Rational voters' anrislavery opinions would surface 
in congres~ional and especially presidential, not municipal or state, elections. Tim glos~ 
probably cxplains why Gienapp fmds a much more pronounced trend toward the Repub-
licans 111 senate d1an in gubernatorial races. S<.:c hi~ Or(f?ills of the Republican Party, 129-
187. 
32 On class and ethnocultura l factors , compare Gicnapp, "Nativism and the Creation of 
a Republ ican Majority," w ith Baum, Ci11il War Party Syste111. My conclusion about atten-
tion to s mall changes is consonant with much of the analys is in Benson, SiJbey, and Phyll is 
F. Field, "Toward a Theory of Stability and Change in American Voring Patterns: New 
York Srate, 1792-1970," in Silbey, Bogue, and Flanigan (eds.), History of America11 F./moral 
Belravior. 78-ros. although rhe amhors draw other conclusions. 
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political-culture interpretations of the Jacksonian era, Holt's ra-
tional-choice-based scheme integrates economic and political his-
tory, electoral behavior and policy, and thought and action. 33 
Likewise, in his richly detailed and methodologically sophis-
ticated synthesis of changes in electoral behavior, voting rules, 
and policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Kleppner views the post-1890 electorate as much more calculating 
and more often recalculating than he pictured the earlier electorate 
in his previous books. Voters punished the Democrats for the 
depression of the 1890s and for the intrusive, ineffective, and 
regionally biased national policies of World War I by shifting 
overwhelmingly to the Republicans, and moved the opposite way 
after 1906 partly because of a perceptible downturn in economic 
conditions during Republican administrations. Ethnoreligious is-
sues were important, but did not divide the parties neatly, so 
prohibitionist voters, for instance, switched parties according to 
the changing positions of different party standard bearers. As more 
policies were determined by experts and fewer by loca lly elected 
officials, voters increasingly abstained. Whether it is ultimately 
accepted in all of its details or not, Kleppner's painstaking portrait 
of the voters as thoughtfully choosy will surely prove inAuential. 34 
Although limitations of space prohibit reviews of the more 
diverse literatures of the other seven subfields of political history, 
it is possible to gauge how the substitution of a rational-choice 
for a social- psychological or symbolic-anthropological viewpoint 
might alter the way in which political history is written, and to 
draw some specific suggestions for historica l studies from the 
political-science literature. Large theories not on ly provide in-
terpretive glosses, but also suggest topics and point to appropriate 
data. If adults arc assumed to identify mindlessly with their par-
ties, then researchers should concentrate on discovering lasting 
33 Fiorina, Retrospectil•t Votlll.~. Sec also a useful review aruclc on the literature, D. 
Roderick Kiewiet and River~. •· A Retrospective on Retro~pccuvc Vottng." in Heinz Eulau 
and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (cds.), Economic Conditions ar1d Elworal Outcomes: Tl1e United 
Swtes tmd Westem Europe (New York, 1985), 207-231. Michael F. Holt, "The Election of 
1840, Voter Mobilizat ion, and the Emergence of the Second Amcric.m Party System: A 
Reappraisa l of Jacksonian Voting Behavior," in Cooper. ct al., Master's Due, 16-58; 
quotation at s8. 
34 Compare especially the first chapters of Klcppner's The Third f:lecroral Sysrem, 1853-
1892 (Chapel Hill , 1979), and his Cor~tinuity and Change i11 Electoral Politi(S, 1893-1928 
(New York, 1987). 
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group loyalties and unraveling the socialization process, rather 
than on issues and elite strategy. Alignments should only gradu-
ally erode except when the disruptions of war or depression or a 
sudden change in the population of electors orients a set of pre-
dominantly new voters overwhelmingly in a particular direction. 
Likewise, if politics is thought to have a primarily affective im-
portance for the vast majority, then scholars should attend to the 
symbols and their man ipulators, and to campaign rituals and 
politicians' charisma, rather than to the influence of the electorate 
on policies, and the reciprocal material and attitudinal effects of 
those policies on the public. If politics , by contrast, is conceived 
of as an arena in which voters, politicians, and nonelected officials, 
all of whom have relatively well-ordered preferences, usually 
attempt to maximize tangible, rather than expressive benefits, 
then fluctuations in electoral outcomes and their correspondence 
with changes in rules, candidates' strategies, and pohcy outputs 
become the very stuff of politics. 35 
By highlighting differences in the questions, choices of evi-
dence, and ex-post- facto rationales that the theories suggest, I do 
not mean to imply that such frameworks are noncomparable or 
insulated from tests. Indeed, a great deal of political science over 
the last two decades has been concerned with delineating and 
assessing the implications of the social-psychological and rational-
choice outlooks, and one of the concerns of political history in 
the future ought to be how it can contribute to that ongoing 
controversy. 36 
The widely recognized theoretical and empirical gaps and 
anomalies in the still developing social-choice field make it un-
35 To speak more in the language of the philosophy of science, large theories define 
what lmre Lakatos called "research programs" and supply what Carl G. Hempel termed 
"covering laws." See Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programs," in idem and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 
(Cambridge, 1970), 91-196; Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York, 1965). 
36 Two early rests of the rational-choice stance were Page, "Elections and Social C hoice: 
The State of the Evidence," American }o11mal of Political Science, XXI (1977), 639-668; 
Frolich et al ., "A Test ofDownsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting," American 
Polirical Science Revierv, LXX II (1978), 178-197. Two examples of the estimation of spatial 
models that should be of particular interest{(> historians because they use mostly aggregate 
data are Howard Rosenthal and Subrata Sen, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth 
Republic," America11 Political Science Review, LXXI (1977), 1447-1466; George Rabinowitz, 
Paul-Henri Gurian, and Stuart Elaine MacDonald, "The Structure of Presidential Elections 
and the Process of Realignment, 1944 to 1980," America11}ottrnal ofPolitical Science, XXVIII 
(1984), 611-635· 
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likely that historians will embrace trus viewpoint unthinkingly. 
Disequilibriums and counterintuitive notions lie at the very heart 
of the outlook: Voting paradoxes are not only possible, bur prev-
alent. The logic of free riding makes it difficult to understand 
why any rational human would ever vote or take part in any 
group activity unless direct! y paid to do so. For most realistic 
political games, there is no "dominant strategy," and for most 
electoral situations, no "stable solution." Social choice theorists 
are a combative and pessimistic lor, and the field contains more 
proofs of nonexistence and impossibility than certitude about the 
pattern of human actions. llistorians who see easy answers-
miracle cures from the social sciences-should not expect to find 
them. 37 
It is precisely this skepticism about received notions, this 
doubting of traditional assumptions and conclusions, that makes 
social choice so appealing for empirical practitioners-it reminds 
us not to let down our intellectual guard, and it makes us active 
participants, not passive consumers, in the pwcess of discovery. 
Why, in light of the free-rider principle, do people participate? 
How, if equilibriums do not generally exist, do politicians choose 
their positions on issues? Is there empirical historical evidence that 
cooperation develops, as Axelrod suggests, because self-interested 
players realize that the political game will be played repeatedly, 
and that the best strategy for all concerned is what he calls "tit 
for tat" (that is, "cooperate" if the other does, but retaliate by 
defecting if he defects first)? What allows democracies to resolve 
conflicts without devolving into dictatorships or oligarchies, as 
many theoretical results predict? Which of the intuitively plausible 
assumptions of social choice that produce such troubling results 
should be rep!Jced, wh ich constraints loosened? How is ration-
37 For instance, Mueller, Public Choice, is full of critical comments. For attempts to build 
altruistic impulses into rational-choice theory, see Howard Margohs, Selfolmess, Altr111sm, 
and Rariona/11y: A Theory of Social Clroirt (Ch.cago, 1982); Frederick Schick, Ha1•in,~ Rrasons: 
An Essay on Rariorrality and Socialiry (Prmceton, 1984). for ,111 mteresting discuss10u of 
some of the problems of applying rational-choice models to the study of rebellions, ~ce 
George Kolsko, Edward N . Muller, and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rebellious Collective Action 
Revisited," Aml'rica11 Political Srimce Rt1ietv, LXXXI (19R7), 557-564. Hisrorians some-
times give the impression that the theories or bits of theories that they borrow from other 
social science> arc universally accepted there. when they arc, m fact, bitterly attacked. 
Consider, for example, the notion of ''political culture" or of Geertzian cultural anthro-
pology. lntcnilsc•plinary borrowmg IS desirable, bur it should be fully informed. 
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ality bounded in particular cases, to state the question in Simon's 
terms, or, to view it another way, what additional assumptions 
about information, uncertainty, and decision-making are neces-
sary to model the real world? Like empirical political scientists 
and experimental economists, historians can play a role in refining 
general theories. 38 
To draw some examples from the Civil War era, why did 
turnout rise in the north in the r8sos? Was it higher in states with 
close elections- where the stake for each voter and party worker 
was larger- than in those where one party won overwhelmingly? 
Why did the Kansas-Nebraska Act, but not the Missouri Crisis 
of 1819 or the Mexican War of the 1840s lead to the formation of 
a viable antislavery political party? Why and how did the expec-
tations of politicians about the potential success of such a party 
change? Could the breakdown of compromise during the 18 sos 
or during r865-1866 usefully be modeled as the abandonment of 
cooperative strategies in a prisoners' dilemma game? Does the 
ability of the national government to avoid dictatorship and to 
preserve most conventional political procedures during the Civil 
War and Reconstruction imply that, far from reducing the number 
of axioms, social-choice theorists need to add constitutional rules 
to their lists of assumptions? 
Thus, political history can add realism and specificity to the 
"stylized facts" that social-choice theorists must explain, just as 
social-choice theory can assist in reorienting histories of political 
attitudes and electoral behavior. But what implications might that 
research program have for other areas of political history? 
First, collective action unconfined to formal political insti-
tutions will be viewed not as a separate, largely emotional or 
symbolic sphere, but as merely another means of rationally seek-
ing to attain political or economic objectives. Many historians 
and other social scientists have always considered this kind of 
behavior as fundamentally instrumental- the organization and 
suppression of labor unions, the formation of producer interest 
groups and of organizations of consumers or potential consumers 
of government services, the mobbing of abolitionists in the pre-
38 Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation; Herbert Simon, "Human Nature in Pol itics: The 
Dialogue of Psychology with Pol itical Science," American Po/irical Science Review, LXXIX 
(1985). 29J-J04. 
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Civil War North, and the violence against southern Republicans 
during Reconstruction. But if observers more often sec conven-
tional and extra-institutional modes as complementary or as sub-
stitutes for each other, the scope of political history will be usc-
fully extended, and questions such as why an individual or group 
chose a particular mix of actions at a particular time may be harder 
to ignore. For example, confronted by well-entrenched parties in 
the I 830s, abolitionists organized primarily as an interest group, 
as farmers did in the 1920s and I 930s under similar political 
conditions. The collapse of one major party in the 18sos encour-
aged antislavery men to stream into a new political party, just as 
the frailty of state-level opposition parties in the south and west 
provided an opening for the Populist Party in the I 88os and 1 89os. 
The failure of the Knights of Labor strikes in I885-1886 made 
political action by the group more attractive. Furthermore, em-
ploying models more explicitly in this area may lead to better 
founded generalizations about sets of events. As Tilly has argued, 
most current collective-action models arc static and ignore the 
effects of interactions between participants. If an individual's de-
cision to take part in a movement is contingent on what others 
do, then only a dynamic theory can explain why any actions arc 
taken at all. Although framing such a theory is immensely diffi-
cult, introducing sequential, interactive clements into notions of 
public choice may provide practical resolutions to some of the 
dilemmas of classical theory. The choices facing voters in presi-
dential primaries or caucuses, for instance, are successfully win-
nowed down at the same time as the information available about 
each candidate grows. In the end, the choice problem usually 
becomes tractable for the delegates and voters- the selection of 
Lincoln, rather than William Henry Seward or Salmon Portland 
Chase is the rule; the deadlock over Douglas in 1860 becomes the 
exception. 39 
39 Dcscn bang action chat one dtsapproves of as irratiOnal may simply be ano ther means 
of decrymg 11, as in much of Richard Hofscadccr's work, o r ic may serve (despite the 
historian 's intentions) as a sort of collective insanity dcfcns~'-mobs or Klansmen cannot 
be held responsible if their motives were subconscious and unconcrollablc. A dcci~ion co 
treat such activity as purposeful or otherwise does not necessarily imply approval, anymore 
than it implies disapproval. See Daniel Joseph Singal, "Ucyond Consensus: Richard Hof-
stadter and American Historiography," American llistoritnl Review, LXXXIX ( 1984), 976-
1004; Charles L. Flyon, "The Anctcnt Pedigree of Violent Repression: Georgia 's Klan as 
a Folk Mo,·ement, " in Walter L. fraser. Jr., and Winifred B. Moore, Jr. , Tltt Somhtru 
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A second major change will be that the study of regulation, 
policy, and the impact of the economy on the government and 
the government on the economy will become more important 
and more integrated with other areas in political history. A con-
siderable literature has grown up about the degree to which reg-
ulatory agencies were created or captured by the interests that 
they were supposed to regulate. This body of scholarship will 
benefit from exposure to the new organizational economics and 
to theories of repeated prisoners' dilemma games, and from more 
self-conscious links with studies of elections and legislatures. This 
area of American research will eventually have the greatest inter-
national impact, because, although not all countries have con-
tested elections, they do have bureaucracies. 40 
Some historians and students of business and bureaucracy 
have already made impressive starts. Whereas Hays, Wiebe, 
Keller, and others have adopted the functionalist view that the 
development of the economy or increasing urbanization and in-
dustrialization necessarily brought increases in government reg-
ulatory activity or in social-welfare schemes, McCormick has 
argued that specific campaigns by politicians in New York and 
other states and by muckrakers across the nation convinced the 
articulate public and, subsequently, majorities of the voters that 
the corruption of politics by business adversely affected their 
interests and that new regulatory institutions run by " impartial 
experts" were needed to combat it. McDonald has demonstrated 
that progressive politicians in San Francisco broke the consensus 
that taxes should be kept low and government services starved. 
Margo has made explicit the conditions under which clectorally 
responsive school boards would distribute funds in a racially dis-
l :n~~nw: Essays 011 RtU(', Class, n11d Folk Cultun· (Westport, 1983), 1 89-198;Jocl Williamson, 
Tile Crucible of Rtue: 0/atk-WIIite Relatio11s i11 tl1e American South Si11te l?ma11cipatioll (New 
York, 1984). On the Kntghts, sec Leon Fink, Worki11gmen's Democracy: The Knights of 
Lt~bor i11 American Politrcs (Urbana, t983), J<> 31. On the need for dynamic models of 
collective action, ~ee Charles Tilly, "Model~ and Realities of Popular Collective Action." 
Soda/ Resenrdr, Lll (1985). 717-747. 
40 Terry M. Moe's ''The New Economic~ of Organization," Amerrcm1 Joumal of Political 
Srirucr, XXVIII ( 19H4). 739-777, is a fine, nonrcchnical review article on the recent 
economics literature on th is subject. On repeated games, sec, for example, Andrew 
Schotter, Tile Ecouomic Theory of Social Iustitutious (Cambridge, l98t}. For the beginnings 
of a rational-choice v1cw of public bureaucracy, sec Thomas H. Ha111mond and Gary J. 
Miller, ''A Social Chotec Perspective on Experti~c and Authority in Bureaucracy," Americmr 
Jcmrual of Political Scirrru, XXIX (1985). 1-2li. 
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criminatory manner, and I larris has shown how administrators 
who were relatively insulated from politics could partially miti-
gate short-term political trends in racial political power. Such 
efforts to pry open the "black box" of functionalism so as to 
expose the individual motives and actions that perpetuated or 
permuted political institutions or shared understandings have a 
natural affinity with the individualistic, anti-deterministic theory 
of rational choice. 41 
Two related topics where historians can learn much from the 
other social sciences and where we can make major contributions, 
the study of the relationship of government to economic inequal-
ity and of the impact of economic conditions on voting, also 
deserve major attention. The attractiveness to candidates of the 
median voter's position suggests that governments will, if they 
adopt redistributive policies at all, reward the middling classes, 
rather than the rich or the poor. To what extent has this pattern 
been true at different times and places and what accounts for any 
variations? Models of the so-called "political-economy cycle" im-
ply that governments try to pump up the economy in time for 
national elections. Did pre-1932 governments try to create such 
cycles, and, if so, when did they start and how did incumbents 
and voters obtain sufficient knowledge about economic conditions 
to be able to act and react? As Holt and Klcppner have shown, 
Americans acted as if they weighed the economic fluctuations of 
the r8JOS, 184os, and 1890s very heavily in their voting decisions . 
Was that true in the 1. 870s as well, and how important were 
41 Morton Keller, A.ffairs of State: Public Life in Late Ni11eteenth Ct'lllury America (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1977); Naomi It Lamoreaux, "Regulatory Agencies," in Greene (cd.), 
Eurydopedia of Ameriratt Political I listory, Ill, 1 107-1117. An imcrc~ting recent study with 
1mphcations for historians I> W1lham D. Berry's "An Alternative to the Capture Theory 
of Regulation: The Case of State Pubhc Utilities Commissions," 1\mmcaujouma/ ofPolirical 
Scimce, XXVIII (1984), 524-558. Many of these state commiss1om and much regulation 
of the economy originated in the nmctccnth cemury. Hays, Respome 1<> ludusrrialism, r87o-
t9t4 (Chicago, 1957); Robert H. W1ebc, The Search for Order, t877-1920 (New York. 
1967); McCormick, "The Di~covcry that Business Corrupts Polittcs: A Reappraisal of the 
Origins of Progressivism," A111ericm1 1-lislorica/ Review, LXXXVI ( 1981), 247-274; idem, 
Fro111 Reali,liiiiiJelll to Rejor111: Politiwl Cila11ge in New York Stare, 189]- 1910 (Ithaca, 1981). 
Terence J. McDonald, "San Fr~ncisco: Socioeconom ic Change, Political Culwre, and 
Fi~ca l Politics, I870-t906," in ide111 and Sally K. Ward (cds.). '/'he Polirics of Urban Fiscal 
Policy (Beverly Hills, 1984), 39-68; Robert Margo, "Race Differences in Public School 
Expenditures: Disfranchisement and School Finance in Louisiana, 1890- 1910," Social Sci-
euu History, VI (1982), 9-33; I farris, "Stability and Change." 
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economic factors, compared to such other issues as the temperance 
crusade or black rights? The cycle hypothesis states that economic 
growth in countries subject to self-interested intervention in the 
economy by politicians ought to show a regular pattern of fluc-
tuations. What about these countries in the past, or the economies 
of nations without competitive elections in both the past and the 
present? Did electors behave as if they had adopted some simple, 
common decision rule, such as economic retrospective voting or 
a checklist of performance items, and under what conditions did 
voting become more concerned with nonpocketbook issues?42 
Third, there will be more emphasis on legislatures . Here, the 
rational-choice perspective will seem more natural to traditional 
historians than the sometimes static and undramatic roll-call anal-
yses of the behavioral approach. The extensive socia l-science lit-
erature on logrolling and vote tradi ng formalizes and extends the 
lreatments of narrative historians of legislatures, who usually fo-
cused on the contingent and dynamic and emphasized the roles 
of leaders. That agenda manipulation may involve timing and 
that evidence of it may reside in private papers once again suggest 
the natural attraction of rational choice to historians. 43 
Recent work in political science also suggests larger structural 
questions about deliberative bodies that story-telling historians 
generally ignore. Under what circumstances do legislatures make 
large and small changes in the structures and levels of funding of 
government? How arc these associated with elections? Were the 
42 For a fascinating, nontechnical introductiOn ro the first topic, sec Page, Who Gets 
What from Govemmeut (Ucrkeley, 1983). On the .. political economy cycle'' and the respon-
Siveness of voters to economic conditions. good places to start arc Kicwict, ,\lacroeco11omics 
mrd .'vficropolitics: The Ji/eaoral Effects of Economic lssru•s (Chicago, 1983); Douglas A. Hibbs, 
Jr., The America~~ Politiwl J?ro11omy: Macroi'COIIomics a11d Electoral Politics (Cambridge, Mass. , 
1987); Holt, "Election of 1840"; Klcppner, Co111i1111ity a11d Cha11ge. 
43 For recent comprehensive literature reviews on legislatures, sec Margaret Susan 
Thompson and Silbcy, "Research on Nineteenth Century Legislatures: Present Contours 
Jnd Future Directions," Legislmive Swdies Quarttrly, IX (1984), J19-J50. The newer, more 
'oph1sttcated spatial procedures for roll call analysis should lead to more interesting 
conclusions than has simple Guttman scaling. For an introduction tO the logrolling liter-
.nurc, see Abrams, Fo1mdarions of Political A11alysis, IOJ-IJS. For an excellent example of 
a tradi tional historical trea tment of legislative strategy, see Cooper, '"The Only Door': 
The Territorial Issue, the Preston Bill, and the Southern Whigs," in idem ct al., A Master's 
Due, 59-86. The explici t connections in the rational-choice literature between unstable 
outcomes in committee~ or lcgislarures and preference structures of members or the public 
that form a "voters' paradox" suggest connection~ between the different areas of political 
hfc that should help to tic together various facets of the historical study of politics. 
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innovations of the members of Congress elected in 1866 less than 
those who took office after "critical elections"? To what extent 
arc such extraordinary alterations due to elite turnover within or 
between parties? In the nineteenth century, when there was much 
more turnover in congressional scats than there is today, was 
there more or less change in legislative policies than currently? If 
legislators were less concerned with reelection than they are as-
sumed to be at present, how can their actions be appropriately 
modeled? What types of policies were adopted consensually, 
which ones provoked conflict and delay, how did the mix of these 
vary from time to time and from place to place, and to what 
degree did uncertainty and differential access to information and 
expertise account for such variations? What devices did legislators 
usc to push or block programs? To what degree were they ideo-
logues, and to what degree, opportunists seeking to enhance their 
chances for reelection or higher office? How did they interact 
with bureaucrats and interest groups? How did the increasingly 
professionalized state education departments of the mid- to late-
nineteenth century, for instance, cooperate with the short-term 
amateurs who sat on state legislative committees on education?44 
Fourth, historians will become more conscious of the con-
ditions under which candidates adopted varying strategies. Did 
candidates appear to move toward the voter with median opin-
ions, as theoretical models suggest, and if not, why not? Did 
pressures from their "core constituencies" or from activists' ideo-
logics lead them to take differing stands on issues and to adopt 
nonconsensual policies in office? Was it virtually inevitable that 
the white and black extremists who constituted the major blocs 
of the southern Democratic and Republican parties, respectively, 
44 David W. Brady, "Congressional Pany Realignments and Transformations of Publtc 
Po hey 111 Three ReJiignmem Era~." American joumal of Polit1cal Scierru. XX VI ( 1982), 
333-36o; Gregory G. Brunk and Thomas G. Minehart, " How Important Is Elite Turnover 
to Policy Change?" ibid., XXVI II (1984), 559-569; Lynn Avery Ilunt, Revolutiorr a11d Urbn11 
Politics i11 Provintial Frn11ce: Troyes nnd Reims, 1786-1790 (S tanford, 1978), 122-128. Since 
the po~ited reelection mori,·e drives many soctal choice models oflegislauve action, studies 
of earlter legislature~ may have to reformulate those models. thus of necessity comributmg 
to theory. For the reelection assumption, see. for example. Barry R. Weingast ct al., ''The 
Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclass ical Approach to the Politics of 
Distribution," joumal of Poliriral flnmomy, LXXXIX (r98t), 642-664. For the effect of 
uncertainty and mformation, sec Kenneth A. Shepslc and Wcingast, '"Pohucal Preferences 
for thl· Pork Harrel: A Generalization," Amfritmr joumal of Politiral Scifi!U, XXV (1981). 
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would eventually drive the two parties apart during Reconstruc-
tion and destroy the chances of moderates?45 
Fifth, the increasingly studied topic of political rules will 
continue to burgeon. What distortions did electoral and allocation 
rules introduce into the political process and how consequential 
were they for the fundamental question of politics-who gets 
what? How did the rules shape the game that politicians and voters 
played? Such questions have fostered a literature in economics 
and political science that is so large-too large, in fact, even to 
begin to cite-that it has been termed "the new institutionalism. "46 
Sixth, the new tools of social-choice and principal-agent the-
ories can help to reintegrate judicial into political history. If the 
courts "follow(ed] the 'illection' returns," did they respond to the 
median voter? What incentives did judges as principals use to 
control other judges, litigants, and potential litigants, and how 
were judges as agents influenced by executives, legislators, and 
constitution-makers? Did litigants as principals view the courts as 
separate from other facets of politics, or did they attempt to reach 
their goals by simultaneously or sequentiaJJy playing the game in 
several political arenas? How did judicial rules and agendas 
change, and what impacts did such modifications have_? Explicit 
theory can offer some illumination on these and other traditional 
questions in legal history, and legal history can in turn alter the 
"stylized facts" that the theorists must attempt to encompass. 47 
Seventh, an emphasis on tangible interests, rather than irra-
tional, symbolic appeals to prejudice against negative reference 
groups can help at once to integrate political, economic, and social 
history and to explain major anomalies in the analysis of political 
events. Historians have long wondered why nativism rose and 
fell so quickly in the north in the I 8 sos. In "Without Consent or 
Contract," Fogel has offered a daring and brilliant explanation. 
45 This is one possible explanation for the find ings of Michael Perman, The Road to 
Redemption: Southem Politics, t869- 1879 (Chapel Hill , 1984). 
46 For an excellent summary of the historical literature on ru les, see Peter H. Argersinger, 
"ElectOral Process," in Greene (ed .), E11cyclopeditl of American Political History, II, 489- 512; 
idem, "The Value of the Vote: Political Representation in the Gilded Age," journal of 
American History, LXXVI ( 1989), 59-90. 
47 See Kousser, " 'The Supremacy of Equal Righ ts ': The Struggle Against Discrimination 
in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment," North-
westem University Law Review, LXXXII (1988), 941-1010. 
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A "hidden depression" gripped native northern workers from 
1848 to r855, spurring a reaction against immigrantjob compe-
tition and immigrant-borne disease. Fortunately for the Repub-
licans, immigration subsided and the industrial economy turned 
up in 1856, which allowed the party to turn the attention of 
workers to slavery and the "sla ve power conspiracy." By treating 
"nativism" as, at least in part, a rational response to economic 
and social trends. Fogel has reduced the weight of random or 
nonrational factors in the account of the period and rejoined three 
fields of history. 48 
Eighth, notions drawn from economics can help to clarify 
and systematize the study of wars and other interactions between 
countries. The American Civil War might well be seen as a Thu-
cididean hegemonic war, with the previously dominant Spartans 
(the South) seeking to put down the threat of the commercial, 
expansive Athenians (the North). A rational-choice framework 
would add a focus on what each side wished to gain, their ex-
pectations about the outcome, and, most in terestingly, their at-
titudes toward risk. 49 
Ninth, since social choice inevitably reopens large, often nor-
mative questions, a reoriented political history will necessarily 
counter the criticism that it must be mired in detailed , particular-
istic studies that ignore broad topics of lasting significance. The 
value-laden problems of how individuals should act tO attain their 
goals, how fair rules should be written, and how political insti-
tutions should be structured so as to be responsive to public 
opinion are never far away from the descriptive problems of how, 
in specified instances, people did act, how procedures were set 
up, and how bodies were o rganized. By self-consciously attending 
to contemporary "scientific" theorizing, historians will simulta-
neously turn again toward the traditional role of history as "phi-
losophy teaching by example. "50 
48 Fogel. Wit/tow Consent or Co11tmct: fllf Rise a11d Fall of America11 Sla11ery (New York, 
l !)l!!)). 354-369. 
49 l~obert Gilpin, "The Theory of llegemonic War, " j oHmal of hllmliscipli11ary History. 
XVIII (1988), 591-613; Bruce Dueno de Mesquita, "The Contribut ion of Expected Utility 
Theory to the Study of Inte rnational Conflict," ibid., 629-652. 
so Plolt, "Axiomatic Social Choice Theory, '' emphasizes the normative a;pccts of social 
choice. The triviality charge is common. See, for example, Bailyn, "Chal lenge of Modern 
Historiography." 
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The realization that a regime or a discipline is in difficulty stim-
ulates many conflicting analyses of the reasons for the dilemma, 
and many proposals for solutions. Although most scholars who 
have recently focused on the fragmentation ofhistorical study and 
its apparent lack of direction have suggested, in effect, that co-
herence be reimposed by concentrating on one aspect of the sub-
ject-typically thought or "culture"-such projects will on ly nar-
row and isolate political history. A common approach and a 
realization of the interrelationships of all of the subcategories of 
the field offer a more promising way to seek un ity and rein-
vigoration. Not only arc rational-choice models likely to bring 
the subdisciplines of political history into closer touch with each 
other; their usc in economics, political science, and sociology 
offers the prospect of increased contact with those disciplines and 
their historical counterparts as well. Theory and empirical re-
search in social choice also suggest new ways to conceptualize old 
questions and raise broad new questions that both traditional and 
behavioral political historians have largely ignored. 
Major advances in disciplines generally come from outside 
or at the intersections of fields. To break through the current 
impasse, political historians need to begin listening harder to what 
economists and political scientists have recently been saying. Po-
litical processes and outcomes arc best understood as a series of 
conscious choices by rational political actors. 
.· 
